“Since the liberty we need is different from that of the ancients, it needs a different organization from that which suited ancient liberty. In the latter, the more time and energy man dedicated to the exercise of his political rights, the freer he thought himself; in the kind of liberty to which we are drawn, the more time the exercise of political rights leaves us for our private interests, the more precious liberty will be to us. Hence the need for the representative system. The representative system is nothing but an organization by means of which a nation charges a few individuals to do what it cannot or does not wish to do itself. Poor men look after their own affairs; rich men hire stewards” (Benjamin Constant).
IN THE CLASSICAL liberal horizon of emancipation, of which Benjamin Constant in his speech of 1918[1] advocates for, freedom from politics is referring to: A) Freedom from state intervention in one’s private affairs, from the restrictions of one’s actions by excessive law[2] and – as in the initial quotation – B) Exemption from the occupation of political engagement. Both dimensions are negatively defined and thus serve to provide the conditions for the practicing of a kind of liberty which is considered an independent and individual activity (Neither effected by nor effecting the actions of others).
This notion of freedom is contrasted to an understanding of freedom which is perhaps emblematically depicted by Hannah Arendt’s notion of Action. Action is the political and the activity which makes humans distinct from animals[3]. It is public in the sense that it is before the eyes of all, necessarily performed with others[4]. The results of political action are always unpredictable[5]. Only once one have mastered the necessities of biological life – an activity located in the private realm - can one become free to join with equals in public. Otherwise one is still considered a slave – a slave to necessity. And a slave to necessity can by definition not create something inherently unpredictable.
When Constant, as an egalitarian liberalist, rejects the ancient form of liberty, it is because: the private realm – in which he locates freedom – is directly subjected to political interference and furthermore: freedom as public action indirectly presupposes the subordination of some people as slaves for the upholding of an elite or a political class’ freedom.
Regarding societal organization, Constant today have what he hoped for, with parliamentary democracy and capitalism as allegedly end of history, but regarding freedom he got more than he bargained for. That is to say, today’s predominant mode of politics is post-politicized bio-politics; on one hand contemporary political discourse denies the existence of fundamental societal antagonisms or conflicts of interests and therefore considers the political a matter to expert management and administration[6], while on the other hand perceiving the regulation of the safety and material welfare of human biological life as its primary objective. However, the post-political discourse is in itself a construct which - with a near-hegemonic status - has immense political implications. Bio-politics is neutralized and politics reduced to the organization of biological life; bio-politics is the sustainment of an endless repetitive cycle and thereby it renders humanity into nothing but naked life or working animals. And to push the implications to the edge: When mass life is the political concern, mass death is a political possibility[7].
If one goes with this diagnosis of contemporary society, then we are already free from politics in the sense of daily political involvement, but not when it comes to the freedom from the excises of political power. The short answer to the initial question is ambiguous: We are not a political subject, but we are the political object. Thus, contemporary society neither satisfies Arendt’s nor Content’s[8] desire for freedom.
The question is whether the rise of the social – the merging of the private and public spheres at the expense of the exclusion of politics - is a necessary consequence of the successes of the liberal project of emancipation? Or in other words, is bio-politics embedded in the constitution of the liberal nation-state (the agency ensuring the liberal rights of freedom)? If the answer is no, then a general desire for an authentic freedom from politics is indeed legit today. If the answer on the other hand is yes, the next question presenting itself is: How to embrace the liberty of the ancients without the subsequent subordination of a workforce of slaves?
[1] Constant, Benjamin (1988): The Liberty of the Ancients Compared whit that of the Moderns (1819), in Bianicamaria Fontana (ed.): The Political Writings of Benjamin Constant. Cambridge.
[2] Ibid. (1988:310-311)
[3] Arendt, Hannah (2006:51ff): Menneskets vilkår (The Human Condition). København : Gyldendal.
[4] Ibid. (2006:37)
[5] Ibid. (2006:182)
[6] Rancière, Jacques (1998): Disagreement. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.
[7] Foucault, Michel (1990:133-159): The History of Sexuality: An introduction vol. I. New York : Vintage.
[8] Constant, Benjamin (1988:312): The Liberty of the Ancients Compared whit that of the Moderns (1819), in Bianicamaria Fontana (ed.): The Political Writings of Benjamin Constant. Cambridge.
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